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Summary 
Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are 
larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has 
mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental 
tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question, though, 
has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax 
to a proxy for its first-best value, an expression for marginal social damage (MSD). On 
closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-
best setting, making it an unreliable proxy for the first-best Pigouvian rate. With these 
concerns in mind, the current analysis reevaluates the central welfare question both directly 
and indirectly and finds that when compared directly to its first-best Pigouvian value, the 
second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. 
Even in cases where the second-best optimal environmental tax is lower than its first-best 
value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that 
the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax 
base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends 
above the first-best Pigouvian rate. Results in the tax interaction literature are fully 
consistent with these interpretations once the effects of normalizations and numeraires are 
fully recognized. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy 
complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods. 
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Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental 
taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. 
This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the 
second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best 
Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question, though, has itself been approached 
indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its 
first-best value, an expression for marginal social damage (MSD). On closer 
examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a 
second-best setting, making it an unreliable proxy for the first-best Pigouvian rate.  
With these concerns in mind, the current analysis reevaluates the central welfare 
question both directly and indirectly and finds that when compared directly to its 
first-best Pigouvian value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally 
rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best 
optimal environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may 
be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal 
benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base 
effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, 
extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. Results in the tax interaction literature 
are fully consistent with these interpretations once the effects of normalizations 
and numeraires are fully recognized. These findings reinforce the intuition that 
environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of 




Key words: optimal environmental tax, second-best, double dividend, tax interaction effect, 
revenue recycling, tax base effect, Pigouvian rate, excess burden   I. Introduction 
 
The central question in the recent environmental tax literature has been whether the 
welfare gains from environmental taxation in a second-best world are greater or smaller than in a 
first-best setting. The “double dividend” literature emphasized the larger welfare gains 
attributable to the efficiency value of pollution tax revenues that could be substituted for 
preexisting distortionary taxes (e.g., Tullock 1967; Terkla 1984; Lee and Misiolek 1986; Pearce 
1991). The subsequent “tax interaction” (TI) literature later rejected the double dividend 
hypothesis, claiming that environmental taxes “exacerbate rather than alleviate preexisting tax 
distortions—even if revenues are employed to cut preexisting distortionary taxes” (Bovenberg 
and de Mooij 1994, p. 1085).
1 
However, this question about the welfare gains from second-best, revenue-neutral 
environmental taxation has been framed indirectly by asking whether the second-best optimal 
environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate.  Bovenberg and de Mooij, 
for example, base their conclusion quoted above on showing that “in the presence of preexisting 
distortionary taxes, the optimal pollution tax typically lies below the first-best Pigouvian tax, 
which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pollution.”  (p. 1085).  Fullerton (1997) 
states the underlying hypothesis succinctly in terms of a test of the “strong form” of the double 
                                                 
1 Other contributions include Parry (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997, 2002) and Fullerton (1997). 
The general finding in the TI literature is that the second-best optimal environmental tax is generally 
lower than in a first-best setting and, by implication, the welfare gains from environmental taxation are 
lower than suggested by a first-best analysis. Exceptions to this general findings (i.e., where it is 
suggested that a double dividend may occur) have been noted in this literature, for example, in cases 
where labor supply is positively affected by improvements in environmental quality (Schwartz and 
Repetto 2000; Parry and Bento 2000; Williams 2002; Jaeger 2002). General analytical expressions for 
second-best optimal taxation were derived by Sandmo (1975), and have been extended for non-linear 
income taxes and costly abatement technology (Cremer, et al. 1998; Cremer and Gahvari 2001), as well 
as for heterogeneous households (Boadway and Tremblay 2008). These results are implicit, however, and 
their precise implications for the welfare effects of environmental taxation remain unclear.  
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 dividend hypothesis, which he defines as the view “that a revenue-neutral switch toward a tax on 
the dirty good and away from taxation of clean goods can improve environmental quality and 
reduce the overall cost of tax distortions.” Fullerton’s formulates his test for models where only 
commodities are taxed so that the environmental tax is understood – given other assumptions – 
to equal the differential between the optimal tax on the dirty good and the optimal tax on clean 
goods. He continues “[b]y implication, this [double dividend] view might suggest that any 
additional revenue requirements should be met by raising the tax on the dirty good by more than 
taxes on clean goods.” (Fullerton 1997, p. 245). Provided some simplifying restrictions are 
placed on the benchmark models under investigation, this test should be a reliable indicator of 
the relative welfare changes between second-best and first-best environmental taxation.  
On closer examination, however, neither Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) nor Fullerton 
(1997) actually perform this test. In the case of Bovenberg and de Mooij, they instead take this 
indirect test one step further removed from the underlying welfare question as follows: rather 
than comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to its first-best Pigouvian value, they 
observe that the first-best optimal tax equals marginal social damage (MSD
1) at the first-best 
optimum, define an expression for MSD
2 and evaluate its value in a second-best setting 
compared to the second-best optimal environmental tax.  
If, however, the value of MSD differs in a second-best setting compared to its first-best 
value, the interpretation of this comparison is ambiguous. Unlike the direct implications of 
Fullerton’s proposed test, the “twice-removed” indirect tests actually undertaken are problematic 
– as we shall see below – because in a second-best setting the value of MSD
2 can no longer be 
relied upon as a proxy for the first-best optimal environmental tax; even its definition is 
ambiguous.  
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 The current analysis reexamines these issues with a view to clarifying the implications 
that can legitimately be drawn for the central question that has motivated both the double 
dividend and tax interaction literatures. Section II presents a “benchmark” model like those used 
in the tax interaction literature to represent a simple, neutral model for purposes of evaluating 
these central issues. Section III takes a direct approach to evaluating the welfare gains from 
environmental taxation. Section IV undertakes the indirect approach proposed by Fullerton. 
Section V examines the effect the tax normalization on these results, and section VI examines the 
definition and value of marginal social damage and its numeraire. Section VII discusses the 
intuitive arguments surrounding this literature, and Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. The Model  
 
The central results and interpretations from the TI literature are understood to relate to 
certain “benchmark” models where a number of simplifying assumption and restrictions have 
been made to facilitate the interpretation.  Typically these models consist of a population of 
identical households with preferences such that:  a) utility is separable in leisure and 
environmental quality, b) production is constant-returns to scale with labor as the sole factor of 
production, c) all goods are average substitutes for leisure, and c) labor supply is upward sloping. 
These restrictions imply that optimal revenue-raising taxation will involve equal taxes on all 
commodities so that the difference between the optimal tax on polluting and non-polluting goods 
will reflect the environmental tax.  
The current analysis employs this benchmark structure with a model that includes only 
two goods, a polluting good z and a clean good x, that are symmetrical and separable arguments 
3 
 in the utility function, where demands are identical and cross-price effects are zero. Since none 
of the results in the recent literature depend on the existence of cross-price effects or 
asymmetries in the consumption sub-utility function, the generality of these interpretations are 
not affected for current purposes. Full income in our model is a time endowment, y, which is 
allocated between leisure, l, and labor supply, y-l. Units are chosen for goods and income so that 
all pre-tax prices equal one.  Environmental quality is E so that the utility function for m identical 
individuals can be described as 
() ( ) ( )   ) ( ) ( , , , E b l h z f x f l E z x u + + + =  
 
with  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' , ' , '( ) 0 '' , ''(z), '' ,   ' 0, '' 0 fxh lfz fx f hl b E bE >> > =, and where E=e(mz), 
e’(mz)>0, e’’(mz)  =0. The household budget constraint is (1+tz)z+(1+tx)x=(y-l)+g where g is a 
lump-sum transfer from government. Household maximization yields the indirect utility function 
for private goods v(1+tz, 1+tx), and demand functions x=s(px), z=s(pz), where sx<0.  
Labor productivity is unity so that aggregate output is defined as m(y-l)=m(x+z). 
Transfers of mg are financed by distortionary taxes which must satisfy a given revenue 
requirement, G. Thus, the social optimization problem can be stated as  
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 This gives us the first-order conditions for setting taxes tx and tz such that 
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where μ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government’s budget constraint, reflecting the 
marginal cost of public funds.  
As pointed out by Schöb (1996) and Fullerton (1997), for benchmark models of this kind 
where the restrictions imply that the optimal revenue-raising taxes are uniform for all goods 
(ignoring externalities), the optimal environmental tax can be identified as the differential 
between the optimal tax on the dirty good and the optimal tax on the clean good (rather than the 
total tax on the polluting good). Alternatively and equivalently one could tax emissions directly. 
For most of the analysis to follow a commodity tax normalization will be used (where all taxes 
are on the expenditure side of the budget constraint), as has been the tradition in much of the 
optimal tax literature (e.g., Ramsey 1927; Sandmo 1975). Later we will indicate how a labor tax 
normalization (including labor taxes) affects nominal taxes, effective taxes and the numeraire.  
 
III. A Direct Approach to Evaluating Welfare Gains 
 
The question of whether the welfare gains from a revenue-neutral environmental taxation 
are greater or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting has important policy 
implications. Indeed, this question has been reframed as asking whether the collective good of 
environmental quality is a complement to, or a competitor with, the provision of other public 
goods.  Do higher government revenue requirements strengthen or weaken the case for 
environmental policy? Or, conversely, does a greater need for environmental policy raise or 
lower the cost to government of providing other public goods?  To evaluate this question as 
5 
 directly as possible, we take two approaches here, one that examines and compares equilibrium 
conditions in first- and second-best settings and one that compares expressions for marginal 
welfare changes in first-best and second-best settings.
2  
  The first approach considers the first-order conditions for our benchmark model in (1) 
and (2), recognizing that when tz=tx, s(px)=s(pz) and x=z. This implies that the marginal cost of a 
tax on z will be lower than the cost of an equal tax on x since (2) has an additional negative term 
in the numerator (given e’<0, sz<0) compared to (1). This term reflects an added benefit or 
“second dividend” for environmental benefits when taxing z to raise revenue.  
Now consider two situations with identical revenue requirements, one with no externality 
(e’=0) referred to as situation A, and the other with an externality (e’<0), denoted as situation B. 








z. Beginning at the optimum for 
situation A, we have tz
*=tx









x based on (1) and (2). To move from this suboptimal tax program (with situation A’s 
optimal taxes applied to situation B) to the optimum for situation B means raising tz and lowering 
tx, which will raise μ
B
z and lower μ
B









z. This result implies that the marginal excess burden of both taxes will be lower 
at the optimum in situation B than in situation A, implying that the total excess burden is also 
lower in situation B than in situation A.  
From these observations we can see that expressions (1) and (2) represent a ratio of costs 
                                                 
2 Efforts to directly evaluate the welfare changes from environmental taxation can be found in the TI 
literature (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 2002), but the welfare expressions are normalized by dividing 
each term by a numeraire, the private marginal utility of income. These expressions are then manipulated 
and decomposed into terms which are said to represent environmental benefits, tax interaction effects, 
etc.. This normalization, however, obscures the interpretation of these expressions because the private 
marginal utility of income in a second-best setting is a function of the level of revenue-raising taxes, and 
for a labor tax normalization the units of income are endogenous to these tax rates.  
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 to benefits. The denominators in (1) and (2) represent the incremental revenue (and its public 
value) – or revenue recycling effect.  The first terms in the numerators of (1) and (2) represent 
the cost of raising revenue imposed on individuals. The ratios will be higher the greater is the 
“tax base effect” from individuals reducing their labor supply and instead consuming non-taxable 
leisure. In the case of the dirty good, μ is lowered as a result of the environmental benefits. 
Second, this apparent complementarity between revenue-raising taxes and environmental taxes is 
symmetrical: each contributes to the goal of the other, and in so doing generates an additional 
benefit that would not otherwise occur. Indeed, in a world with abundant externalities deserving 
taxation, one could in principle fund all government services without distortions. 
These observations suggests that from a starting point with equal taxes on x an z, it will 
be welfare improving to raise the tax on the dirty good and lower the tax on the clean good. 
Whether the optimum will occur at a point where the differential between tz and tx cannot be 
ascertained from this thought experiment; It will depend on how the values of μx and μz change 
as the two taxes diverge. Thus, in a second-best setting the marginal benefits from the initial 
introduction of small environmental taxes will exceed those from a comparable Pigouvian 
analysis, but as the environmental tax is increased the corresponding revenue recycling benefits 
may decline relative to the tax base effects, giving rise to an optimal environmental tax that is 
either higher or lower than for a first-best setting. As a result, the total net welfare gain may be 
greater or smaller than a Pigouvian analysis would suggest.  
Our second approach examines the marginal welfare effects of revenue-neutral 
environmental taxation in more detail. We want to compare the expressions for marginal welfare 
changes for environmental tax reform with those of a first-best Pigouvian analysis for the 
specific model reflected in expressions (1) and (2). In both cases our starting point is one with 
7 
 equal taxes on both goods, tx=tz=0 in the first-best case, and tx=tz>0 in the second-best case. 
Environmental tax revenues gained when raising tz are returned lump-sum to the economy via g 
in the first-best case, and in the second-best case they are used to lower tx so that a balanced 
budget is maintained.  
The marginal welfare change (dW
1) in a first-best setting for introduction of an 
environmental tax can be written 
 
() z s t z s e mU
dt
dW
z z z E
z
+ + − = α λ '
1
       ( 3 )  
 
where α is the social marginal utility of the lump-sum income, g, given to an individual. This 
notation distinguishes the value of these lump-sum transfers from μ, the value of Lagrange 
multiplier when the government budget constraint is binding (and distorting). In the absence of a 
binding revenue constraint μ=α and at the first-best optimum α=λ as we shall confirm shortly.  
With no binding revenue requirement, the social planner’s first-order condition can be 
expressed as  
 
N ( ) ' Ez z z
consumer environmental benefit lump sum surplusloss
transfer gain
mU e s z t s z λα
−
=− +  	  
 	 

      ( 4 )    
 
where the optimum occurs when the marginal environmental gain (left-hand side) is equal to the 
difference between the marginal consumer surplus lost (the first term on the right-hand side) and 
the marginal social value of the transfer returned to the economy. The value of the lump-sum 
8 
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The first two terms of (5) correspond to the social marginal utility of income as recognized by 
Diamond (1985); the third term augments Diamond’s definition to include environmental effects. 
Given tx=0 and μ=α, (4) and (5) can be solved simultaneously to obtain tz = -mUEe’/α.  Indeed, 
substituting tz = -mUEe’/α in (5) we can see that the second and third terms cancel so that α=λ. 
Substituting α=λ into (4) also eliminates terms so that we can confirm that the optimal 
environmental tax is 
1
z τ = -mUEe’/α.          ( 6 )  
 
where the superscript 1 indicates the first-best optimum.  
The use of α as the numeraire is intuitive given that it reflects the value of lump-sum 
income. But because it is also true at the first-best optimum that the private (λ), social (α), and 
public sector (μ) marginal utilities of a unit of income are all equal, any one of these could be 
chosen to define the Pigouvian rate. Indeed, the first-best, first-order condition (4) can be 
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.         ( 7 )  
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 Recognizing λ=α at the first-best optimum, the second term on the left-hand side equals zero. 
This manipulation can be interpreted as offsetting the primary cost (lost consumer surplus) with a 
portion of the third term in expression (4) representing the lump-sum return of revenues to 
households. This leaves, however, the term on the right-hand side reflecting the distortionary 
cost that is not offset by the lump-sum return of revenues. This expression also reduces to (6).  
  In a second-best setting, environmental taxation implies that the revenue changes from 
increases in tz will be offset by reductions in tx. The marginal welfare change for revenue-neutral 
tax shift, denoted dW
2, can be written as  
 
( )
() x s t
z s t








+ − = λ λ '
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dt
λμ =− + ) +
                                                
       ( 9 )  
 
where μx denotes the social marginal utility of public funds when revenue requirement are 
binding and taxes are distortionary.
3  
  Comparing these expressions there are some similarities and differences between the 
welfare changes in the first-best (3) and second-best (9) settings. First, for the initial increment of 
environmental taxation, the welfare changes are identical in both settings, and equal to the 
 
3 These expressions would include additional terms without the assumption that cross-price effects are 
zero. The general interpretations, however, are applicable to realistic settings with positive and 
symmetrical cross-price effects.  
10 
 environmental benefits reflected in the first term. Note that in (3) with tz=0, the first term reduces 
to αz, which in our first-best setting has the same magnitude and opposite sign as -λz. Similarly 
in (8) with tz=tx, the ratio in the third term reduces to one, and -λx+λz=0 given x=z. The initial 
gain from environmental tax reform is just equal to the reduction in environmental damages, and 
this is the case in both the first-best setting and the second-best setting.  
Differences emerge, however, in how the marginal welfare changes evolve for these two 
cases as the environmental tax is increased. For situations with positive levels of tz, x>z so that 
the ratio in the third term of (8) no longer equals one, and also -λx+λz≠0. In (3) and (9) we have 
the first term on the right-hand side equaling the environmental benefit. At the second-best 
optimum we can set (9) equal to zero and rearrange as  
 
'( ) E z mU e s z t s z z μ λ μ +− =        ( 1 0 )  
 
Comparing this second-best relation to its first-best counterpart in (8) is illumination. The first 
left-hand side terms are equal in both situations, reflecting the environmental benefits from 
taxing z. The second terms on the left-hand sides of these expressions are very similar, but 
whereas this term equals zero and drops out at the first-best optimum (the value of revenues 
collected is equal to its value when returned lump-sum to the economy), it has a positive value in 
the second-best case given μ>λ. This term reflects the “revenue recycling effect” or the 
incremental revenue valued at the difference between its public and private marginal utility (μ-
λ). The term will be larger the greater is the difference between the marginal utility of public 
funds and the private marginal utility of income.  
The right-hand side term in (10) is similar to the corresponding term in (7) except that it 
11 
 is weighted by μ rather than λ. Since μ>λ in the second-best case, this cost is higher in the 
second-best setting compared to a first-best setting, reflecting both the private distortionary cost 
and the fiscal or tax base effect. Indeed, we can decompose (10) into two components to get  
 
   
N
cos
'( ) ( ) E z zz zz
primary t revenue environmental tax base
recycling benefit effect
effect
mU e s z t s t s μ λλλ μ +− = − +−  	 
   	 
 
  	 
                                                
.   (11) 
 
where the first right-hand side term is the primary cost – similar to (7), and the second term 
represents the fiscal cost or tax base effect – the narrowing of the tax base as increasing tz 
reduces consumption of z. Overall, then, (11) can be interpreted as setting marginal 
environmental benefits plus the marginal revenue recycling effect equal to the marginal primary 
cost plus the marginal tax base effect.
4  
Based on the above, we conclude that in a second-best setting with revenue-raising taxes 
only, raising the environmental tax incrementally will initially be welfare improving. As the 
environmental tax is increased further, the revenue recycling benefits (the second term on the left 
of (10)) will decline and the tax base effects (the second term on the right side of (10)) will 
increase. The eventual optimal environmental tax will depend on how these changes evolve. 
 
4 One caveat is in order, here. The decomposition of the right-hand side term from (10) into the two terms 
in (11) could have been accomplished by introducing α in both terms rather than λ.  This would alter the 
relative magnitudes of the two terms but leave their sum unchanged. Using λ gives the appearance that 
the primary cost term is the same in (10) as in (7), but this may be misleading since λ is lower and tz is 
higher in the second-best setting the higher is the level of taxes (more on this below). Using α to 
decompose the two terms would allocate the cost between these two components differently (and 
potentially with little change in value compared to the first-best setting). However, since neither the social 
nor the private marginal utility will have precisely the same value in a second-best setting as in a first-best 
setting, the preferred or most intuitive choice for the current interpretation is debatable. What is certain is 
that the sum of these two terms is greater than the right-hand side term in (8) because μ>α>λ, so that the 





Whether the optimal environmental tax will be higher or lower than in the first-best case is 
ambiguous at this point. But even if the second-best environmental tax is lower than in first-best, 
it does not necessarily follow that the welfare gains in a second-best setting are also lower.  
These relationships are illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B. In Figure 1A, a first-best 
analysis would involve a “primary” trade-off involving environmental marginal benefits (MBE) 
and marginal primary costs (MC), giving rise to a first-best optimum at Q*
1 with net benefits 
equaling area A.  In a second-best setting there are also secondary fiscal marginal benefits 
(revenue recycling gains MBRR added in Figure 1 to MBE) and marginal costs (tax base effects, 
MCTB, subtracted in Figure 1 from MBRR+MBE). As abatement increases in response to the 
environmental tax the secondary marginal benefits (revenue recycling, MBRR) are traded-off 
against secondary marginal costs (tax base effects, MCTB). The optimum occurs when the sum of 
primary and secondary marginal benefits equal the sum of primary and secondary marginal costs 
– or when MBE+MBRR-MCTB=MC. In Figure 1A this occurs where the second-best optimum, 
Q*
2 is higher than Q*
1, and with welfare gains equal to areas A and B.  
Other outcomes are possible such as the one depicted in Figure 1B where Q*
2 is below 
Q*
1. In this case the marginal net benefits were positive at low environmental taxes, but as the 
environmental tax is increased the tax base effect grows larger relative to the revenue recycling 
effect, causing the optimum to occur below Q*
1. In this case the welfare gains are equal to 
triangles A+B-C, which may be larger or smaller than for the first-best analysis depending on the 
relative sizes of B and C.  
Concluding that the second-best optimal pollution tax is below the first-best Pigouvian 
rate is not sufficient evidence to infer that the welfare gains from environmental taxation are less 
than in a first-best case. Indeed, all of the welfare changes associated with second-best   
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 environmental taxation occur in expressions (1) and (2), and also (7) and (11). The costs that do 
appear are the well-known Ramsey tax base effects present for taxes on all commodities.  The 
first-order conditions for commodities are similar to those we would see for direct taxation on 
emissions. And the situation depicted in Figure 1A is consistent with our analysis suggesting that 
environmental taxation and the provision of other public goods are complements rather than 
competitors. 
 
IV. The Second-Best Optimal Environmental Tax Compared to its First-Best Value  
 
Here we carry out the test proposed by Fullerton (1997) to evaluate whether the optimal 
environmental tax increases or decreases as revenue requirements increase beyond levels that can 
be satisfied with revenues from a first-best Pigouvian tax. If the optimal tax on the dirty good 
increases faster than the optimal tax on the clean good, the environmental tax (differential), τ, is 
increasing along the continuum of rising government revenue requirements.
5 And by 
implication, the welfare gains from environmental taxation would affirm Fullerton’s “strong 
form” of the double dividend hypothesis, improving the environment and reducing the overall 
cost of tax distortions.  
Although Sandmo’s (1975) second-best optimal tax expressions cannot be interpreted 
directly by inspection for our purposes, we can interpret them by making use of the assumptions 
for our baseline model. Sandmo’s expressions can be written transparently with current notation 
for goods x and z as 
                                                 
5 Given our assumption of linear environmental damages, the utility measure of marginal damages is 
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where R is the Ramsey term.
 6   
For clarity it’s important to note that Sandmo’s original notation for the expression in 
(12) has at times created confusion in the literature about the separability of terms and the 
transparency of their interpretation.  The second term on the right-hand side of (12) cannot be 
evaluated as an additive component of the nominal tax on the dirty good, tz, because it appears in 
both numerator and denominator of the left-hand side. Changes in the value of the second term 
on the right will alter tz in non-additive ways.
7 
  Sandmo’s expressions can, however, be rearranged to produce a separable expression for 
                                                 
6 The Ramsey term, R refers to a term involving elements of the matrix of uncompensated demands of 
taxed goods, S. In a model with n goods, defining Sij as the cofactor of the element in the ith row and jth 











= ≡ .  This term reflects the 
revenue generating potential for a marginal change in the tax on xi due to the direct and indirect effects on 
consumption of all goods.   
7 Sandmo defines tax rates as the tax-inclusive rate or θk = tk/(1+tk) rather than as the nominal tax.  
Nevertheless, Sandmo’s result in (12) has been mistakenly represented as   τ
η η
1 1
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by Fullerton and similarly by Auerbach and Hines where τ is the Pigouvian rate, η is the marginal cost of 
public funds (μ/λ), and R is the Ramsey term.  Fullerton’s interpretation is that for clean goods the second 
term on the right-hand side is zero, and so the differential between the optimal tax on a dirty good and a 
clean good equals the second term. He concludes from this that “with distorting taxes in the economy, a 
marginal dollar of revenue has a social cost that is more than a dollar (η >1 ) . Thus, the environmental 
component (τ/η) is less than the Pigovian rate (τ).(p. 248)” Auerbach and Hines similarly conclude that 
the tax on the dirty good will “equal the sum of the ‘optimal’ tax that ignores the externality… plus a term 
that reflects the cost of the externality. This second term equals the corrective Pigouvian tax … divided by 
the [marginal cost of public funds], μ/λ.(p. 1388)” Correct interpretation of Sandmo’s notation does not 
support these conclusions.  
  17the nominal environmental tax. Multiplying both sides by (1+tz) we have 
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Defining t as the common value of the optimal tax on clean goods (dropping the subscript), and 
with our maintained assumption symmetric demands for both polluting and non-polluting goods 
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and thus we can express the environmental tax τ
c (=tz-t, where the superscript indicates a 
commodity tax normalization, discussed below) as 
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From this expression we can see that the change in the environmental tax with increased 
revenue requirements is ambiguous. Increased revenue requirements will increase t in the 
numerator of (15) but we also expect μ to rise (for realistic models where labor supply is 
upward-sloping so that taxes are distortionary). The question of whether the environmental tax 
rises or falls with increased revenue requirements, therefore, will depend on how 1+t rises 
relative to μ.  
The expression in (15) can be used to evaluate the relationship between the optimal 
environmental tax in a first-best setting, τ
1, and in a second-best setting, τ
2. At the first-best 
optimum we know that t=0, and μ
1=λ. In the second-best setting we have τ
2 = (1+t)mUEe’/μ
2, so 
that the ratio τ
2/τ
1 can be written as (1+t) μ
1/μ
2. We can express the ratio of the social value of 
public funds between second- and first-best settings as μ
2/μ
1=1+MEB where MEB is the 
marginal excess burden of the tax (expressed in dollars). Combining these expressions, and 
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  19We now have an expression of the relationship between the first-best and second-best 
environmental tax, and we see that it may rise, or fall, depending on whether (1+t) rises more or 
less than (1+MEB) as revenue requirements increase above the first-best starting point.  
This relationship is implicit in Browning’s (1987) seminal analysis of the marginal 
welfare cost of taxation for the U.S. economy. For his primary “polar case” where marginal 
government spending provides benefits that return taxpayers to their initial utility levels (i.e., 
prior to the tax and expenditure changes), and assuming incremental tax revenue is derived from 
proportional changes in all tax rates, Browning’s expression for the marginal excess burden 
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where η is the compensated labor supply elasticity. For the commodity tax normalization, the tax 
on each commodity satisfies tL=(t/1+t). With a common tax and identical demands we can 









































































































MEB     (17) 
 
Combining (17) with (16) we can express the ratio of the second-best environmental tax to the 

















































































































t     (18) 
For a range of key parameter values and assumptions, Browning has presented estimates of 
MEB. These estimates in turn permit us to compute the optimal environmental tax as a percent of 
its first-best Pigouvian rate for a commodity tax normalization, which will allow us to perform 
Fullerton’s test using (18). Results are shown in Table 1, indicating that the second-best optimal 
environmental tax exceeds its first-best Pigouvian value for all but a few combinations of 
extreme parameter values considered by Browning.  For central parameter values the optimal 
environmental tax is estimated to be 25% – 40% above its first-best value.   
The expressions above can be used to estimate a continuous relationship between the 
optimal environmental tax differential and revenue requirements for specific central parameters 
and assuming a constant labor supply elasticity. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2 as 
a percent of the first-best Pigouvian rate, and for each of three compensated labor supply 
elasticities, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4.  These estimates indicate that the optimal environmental tax will 
rise above its first-best level and remain there for the tax rates and labor supply elasticities 
relevant to the U.S. economy. Only at commodity tax rates of 150% (equivalent to a 60 percent 
income tax) does the optimal environmental tax begin to drop below its first-best level due to a 
shift onto the downward slope of the revenue or “Laffer” curve. For the central estimates used in 
much of the literature (a 40% income tax and η=0.3), the optimal environmental tax is estimated 
from (18) to be 33 percent above its first-best level.   
An obvious alternative approach to test whether the optimal environmental tax rises or 










Table 1. Optimal environmental tax as a percent of the first-best Pigouvian rate
Income tax rate: 0.38 0.43 0.48
Labor supply elasticity: 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4
dm/dt
Earnings 0.8 147% 140% 135% 156% 148% 141% 167% 157% 148%
   constant 1.0 143% 136% 129% 152% 143% 134% 162% 150% 140%
1.39 138% 128% 120% 145% 133% 123% 153% 138% 127%
2 129% 117% 108% 134% 120% 109% 140% 123% 110%
Earnings 0.8 145% 137% 129% 154% 143% 133% 164% 149% 135%
   decline 1.0 141% 131% 121% 149% 135% 122% 156% 138% 120%
1.39 133% 119% 105% 138% 119% 101% 142% 117% 92%
2 121% 101% 81% 122% 95% 68% 120% 84% 48%






  22falls with increased revenue requirements is with a numerical general equilibrium model 
calibrated consistent with these same benchmark assumptions. Indeed, such models can be found 
in the TI literature, and in one well-known example (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996) optimal 
carbon tax results are provided for a range of income tax levels in a model where marginal 
damages are assumed to be $75/ton. These results can be renormalized for our commodity tax 
normalization so that the optimal carbon tax reflects the differential between the optimal taxes on 
polluting and clean goods. These optimal carbon taxes are shown in Figure 3, where they rise 
from a first-best value of $75/ton to $100/ton when tax rates are assumed in the model to be 
similar to those existing in the U.S. economy (equivalent to a 40% income tax).
8 These 
numerical results conform very closely to those presented in Figure 2 where the optimal 
environmental tax rises about 33% above its first-best value for a 40% labor tax rate. By 
implication these results suggest that the welfare gains from environmental taxation in a second-
best setting are larger than in the first-best setting, consistent with areas A+B in Figure 1A.  
The analysis thus far supports the notion that the welfare gains from environmental taxation will 
generally be higher in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting because, over a range of 
incremental increases in the environmental tax, the marginal fiscal benefits (revenue recycling 
effect) will be larger than the marginal fiscal costs (tax base effect). For benchmark models 
calibrated to represent the U.S. economy, the optimal environmental tax is estimated here to be 
25% - 40% higher than the first-best Pigouvian rate.   
                                                 
8 Similar results are found for a numerical general-equilibrium model in which climate change damages 
affect productivity rather than amenities. Jaeger (2002) finds the optimal (effective) carbon tax to be 53% 
above its first-best level for tax rates equivalent to a 40% income tax.  Jaeger’s estimates are higher than 
the 33% increase implicit in Bovenberg and Goulder’s analysis because the climate externality is assumed 
to affect productivity (e.g., climate change is assumed to reduce productivity in sectors such as agriculture 
and forestry, and to reduce productivity of fixed assets). Introduction of the carbon tax lowers emissions 
which raises productivity and output, which in turn broadens the tax base allowing the overall level of 
taxes to be slightly lowered. In this way Jaeger’s model differs from the current benchmark models.  
 






























































Equivalent income tax rates corresponding to commodity taxes imposed)
Figure  2. Optimal environmental tax with varying revenue requirements and constant labor supply elasticities:
































Equivalent income tax rates corresponding to commodity taxes imposed
Figure 3. The Optimal Carbon Tax Under Varying Revenue Requirements:
Commodity Tax Normalization
Source: Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, p. 994).
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V. Tax Normalizations and their Effects 
 
How are these results affected by the use of a different tax normalization? In terms of 
welfare, resource allocation, or any other real variables, changing the tax normalization are 
understood to have no effect at all. In terms of appearances, nominal values, and the units of 
income, a change in tax normalization alters these results across different revenue requirements 
in ways that have obscured their meaning and produced misleading interpretations.  
A labor tax normalization involves introducing revenue-raising taxes on the income side 
of the budget constraint rather than on the expenditure side. This has one advantage, but also 
distinct disadvantages. The advantage is that income taxes are present in the U.S. economy and 
many other countries, and so the actual implementation of optimal environmental taxes in these 
contexts would need to take account of these tax structures. Income taxes also affect our 
estimates of environmental damages (depending on the methods used) and the nominal value of 
the optimal environmental tax.  
Our main interest here, however, is not tax implementation but answering a theoretical 
question about the welfare gains from environmental taxation. And in that regard, the income tax 
normalization has a distinct disadvantage. When taxes are introduced on both sides of the budget 
constraint there is a direct compounding effect, or “double taxation” involving these direct and 
indirect taxes.  The specific implications are as follows:  
Given the symmetry imposed for the benchmark models, the optimal revenue raising tax 
program will require uniform taxes on all expenditures or, equivalently, a tax on labor income. In 
a perfectly competitive economy, a labor tax tL will be equivalent to a uniform commodity tax t 
  25so long as 1-tL=1/(1+t). This is understood to be a nominal phenomenon with no effect on any 
real variable, or on the distortions at all margins (Fullerton 1997; Schöb 1996). The model’s 
household budget constraint under a commodity tax normalization:  
 
   ( y-l) = (1+t)x + (1+t+τ)z .        (19) 
 
If the revenue raising tax, t, is zero, then the only tax is the environmental tax τ
c. With a positive, 
uniform revenue-raising tax, t, the environmental tax τ will be added so that the total tax on z is 
t+τ
c. In the case of a labor tax normalization, a tax program equivalent to (19) can be 
implemented where a labor tax tL replaces t where 1-tL=1/(1+t). Algebraically both sides of (19) 
are multiplied by (1-tL) and 1-tL=1/(1+t) is substituted where convenient. The resulting labor tax 
normalization can be represented in terms of τ from (19) included as  
 
   ( y-l)(1-tL) = x + (1+(1-tL) τ
c)z        (20) 
 
With the labor tax normalization the (nominal) environmental tax is still considered to be the 
differential between the tax on z and the (zero) tax on x. Its value differs between the two 
normalizations in (19) and (20); the difference being a function of the revenue raising tax level 




c (1-tL) .            ( 2 1 )  
 
It follows that τ
L<τ
c and that the difference between the two is an increasing function of the tax 
  26rate.
 9  The implication is that when starting from a first-best optimum with a Pigouvian tax, the 
introduction of revenue-raising taxes will cause adjustments in the optimal environmental tax 
(differential), and these adjustments will differ for these two tax normalizations.  Indeed, for the 
results presented above they trend in opposite directions. Since differences across these two 
normalizations involve only nominal phenomenon with no effect on any real variable, the real 
disincentives facing polluters are the same for both normalizations, as are the welfare effects 
from environmental taxation.   
  A useful distinction can be made between the “nominal environmental tax” and the 
“effective environmental tax.” The nominal environmental tax in each case equals τ
c for the 
commodity tax normalization and τ
L for the labor tax normalization. It is simply the differential 
between the ad valorem tax on z and on x.  The effective environmental tax is defined to account 
for the compounding effects or double taxation if there are direct and indirect taxes on both the 
income and expenditure sides of the budget constraint. The effective environmental tax can be 
understood to be asking: How much revenue is generated from the presence of the pollution tax 
when holding consumption constant?  
For the commodity-tax normalization, the nominal and effective taxes are the same: each 
unit of z consumed will generate an additional τ in revenue compared to when τ=0. For an 
income tax normalization with a labor tax tL and an environmental tax τ
L, a household will pay a 
pollution tax τ
L compared to the case where τ
L=0. To finance τ
L, however, the household will 
need to increase labor supply by τ
L/(1-tL). This represents the additional tax revenue resulting 
from the pollution tax, and can also be expressed as τ
L(1+t). From the identities for the two 
normalizations we know that τ
L(1+t)= τ
L/(1-tL)=τ. Thus, the effective environmental tax for the 
                                                 
9 The observation that the optimal environmental tax differential varies depending on the tax 
normalization is recognized by Auerbach and Hines (2002) and is acknowledged by Williams (2001).  
  27income tax normalization is equal to the nominal (and effective) tax under the commodity tax 
normalization. In one case there is only a direct tax on pollution that is relevant; in the other case, 
the tax has been separated into a direct and indirect component.
10  The commodity tax 
normalization has an advantage of avoiding confusion since the nominal and effective 
environmental taxes are the same.   
Given these equivalencies across tax normalizations, Sandmo’s optimal tax expression in 
(15) above can be transformed for an income tax normalization (with superscript L) by 




' e mU E L =
.          ( 2 2 )  
 
Indeed this is equivalent to the optimal environmental tax expression derived by Bovenberg and 
Goulder (1996, p. 987).
11  
From (22) we see that for benchmark models involving a labor tax normalization, and 
assuming that μ increases with rising revenue requirements, the nominal environmental tax will 
indeed decline below its first-best Pigouvian value in a second-best setting.  This differs from the 
                                                 
10 The definitions of nominal and effective taxes are, of course, distinct from their marginal revenue 
which depends on the responsiveness of consumers to price changes.  
 
11 This formulation of the tax differential between the optimal tax on the dirty good and the optimal tax 
on the clean good implicitly defines it as the environmental component (similar to Fullerton (1997), 
Schöb (1996), and others). One may also consider a portion of this differential to be a “Ramsey portion” 
of the environmental tax (for example, the portion of the differential which exceeds the first-best 
Pigouvian tax). The differential can be represented, or thought of, either way, both intuitively and 
algebraically. The question being addressed here, however, makes no distinction in that regard. We are 
looking only to see whether the entire differential rises or falls with an increase in revenue requirements.  
  28commodity tax normalization in (15) and estimated for a range of parameters in Table 1. Indeed, 
the same Table 1 results are shown in Table 2 to reflect the nominal environmental taxes for a 
labor tax normalization. These results confirm that while the effective tax will rise above its first-
best value, the nominal environmental tax will drop below the first-best Pigouvian tax in a model 
with a labor tax normalization. Each of the nominal tax changes indicated in Table 2 when going 
from a first-best optimum to a second-best optimum correspond to the effective tax changes 
shown in Table 1.  
  As a practical matter when measuring environmental damages or estimating what the 
corresponding nominal tax rate should be, an income tax normalization raises issues that have 
not received much attention in the literature.  For example, if marginal damages are estimated on 
the basis of individuals’ after-tax income, these estimates may understate the social damages to 
the extent that they exclude lost government revenue or overall effects on GDP (for example in 
the case of reduced agricultural yields or lost labor productivity). Measurement issues of this 
kind occur for health impacts similar to on-the-job risks to life and health, where estimates of 
individual willingness-to-pay to reduce risks will correspond to their after-tax wages rather than 
their gross wages (Viscusi 1993). Marginal social damages, however, will include the lost gross 
income including both the public value of reduced revenues and the private value of foregone 
after-tax wages. Measurement issues of this kind can be addressed by noting these differences 
and the gross wage impacts corresponding to damages that have been measured in after-tax  





















Table 2. Optimal environmental tax as a percent of Pigouvian rate for a labor tax normalization
Income tax rate: 0.38 0.43 0.48
Labor supply elasticity: 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4
dm/dt
Earnings 0.8 91% 87% 83% 89% 85% 80% 87% 82% 77%
   constant 1.0 89% 84% 80% 87% 81% 77% 84% 78% 73%
1.39 85% 79% 74% 83% 76% 70% 79% 72% 66%
2 80% 73% 67% 77% 69% 62% 73% 64% 57%
Earnings 0.8 90% 85% 80% 88% 82% 76% 85% 78% 70%
   decline 1.0 88% 81% 75% 85% 77% 69% 81% 72% 63%
1.39 83% 74% 65% 79% 68% 57% 74% 61% 48%
2 75% 63% 50% 69% 54% 39% 63% 44% 25%
   Based on Browning (1987). 
 
  




VI. Marginal Social Damage and its Numeraire 
 
Instead of comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to its first-best 
counterpart, can we compare it to MSD
2 and still make the same inferences about the welfare 
gains from environmental taxation?  The short answer is no. The second-best optimal tax can 
defined using one of three possible numeraires representing the social, private or public sector 
marginal utility of income. From (15) these can be expressed in terms of MSD
2, but where any 
one of three definitions of MSD
2 (in brackets) is used: 
 
''
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
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           (23)   
 
Similarly for a labor tax normalization, these same three expressions become:  
 
  '' L EE mU e mU e mU e αλ
τ
' E
μ αμ λ μ
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       ( 2 4 )  
 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, rather than raising the estimates of marginal environmental damage to account for the 
lost revenues associated with losses in after-tax income, one could interpret the difference between net 
and gross income effects from environmental improvement (in response to a pollution tax) as a “benefit-
side tax interaction effect,” as Williams (2002) has done.  
  31The indirect test of the double dividend proposition as proposed by Fullerton is whether 
τ
2> τ
1. Instead of comparing τ
2 to the left-hand side of (6), the TI literature has instead compared 
τ
2 to the right-hand side of (6), or MSD. This substitution of MSD for τ
1 would be satisfactory 
and consistent with the approach taken above if MSD were a reliable proxy for τ
1, stable and 
unaffected by the introduction of revenue-raising taxes. Given the assumption that e’’=0 the 
numerator of MSD is unaffected by changes in resource allocation. The denominator, however, 
is the numeraire unit of value and it is affected by revenue-raising taxes; indeed in the presence 
of revenue-raising taxes the definition of the numeraire becomes ambiguous, as described in (23) 
and (24) based on numeraires reflecting the private, social, and public sector value of income. 
Some of these versions of MSD have values greater than τ
2, others lower (see Jaeger 2004). As a 
result, the test 
2 MSD τ ><  is not equivalent to the test 
21 τ τ ><  if 
1 MSD τ ≠ .  
The practice in most of the TI literature has been to utilize the private marginal utility of 
income, λ, as the numeraire rather than the social marginal utility of income, α. Others have 
emphasized expressions involving the marginal rate of substitution between environmental 
quality and public goods, μ (van der Ploeg and Bovenberg 1994; Orosel and Schöb 1996). In 
principle, any one of these could be used to set the optimal environmental tax. For two of the 
three versions of MSD with a commodity tax normalization, the optimal environmental tax 
would be higher; for two of the three measures under a labor tax normalization the optimal 
environmental tax would be lower than MSD. For all three expressions (corresponding to a given 
normalization), the only difference is how MSD is defined: the left-hand side is unaffected. Can 
any of these be said to represent the valid test of whether the welfare gains from environmental 
taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best case? There does not 
appear to be a straightforward way to prove the superiority or legitimacy of one numeraire over 
  32others for our test. However, a strong case can be made for using the social marginal utility of 
income because it is the most stable across revenue requirements, and it represents a consistent 
and intuitive concept: the value to society of giving an individual an extra unit of income, taking 
account of the incremental revenue it generates.
13  
It is worth emphasizing that the choice of numeraire has no effect on the optimal 
environmental tax; it has no effect on whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is 
higher or lower than its first-best counterpart; and it has no effect on the welfare gains from 
environmental taxation in a second-best setting, or how they compare to a first-best setting. The 
choice of numeraire only affects appearances, whether the second-best optimal environmental 
tax appears to be higher or lower than one of six possible expressions for MSD.  
One expression for MSD among the six in (23) and (24) is problematic not just because 
its value is endogenous to the revenue requirement, but because its value depends on the 
normalization. This expression involves the use of λ as the numeraire under a labor tax 
normalization; the version used in most of the T I literature. For a labor tax normalization and 
when using the private marginal utility of income as the numeraire, not only does the value of 
income change with the level of revenue-raising taxes but the units change as well. This 
endogenous relationship between the labor tax and the income unit may not be obvious in 
analytical models where units have been chosen so that pre-tax prices equal one. In the interest 
                                                 
13 The choice of which marginal utility of income to use as the numeraire is analogous to choosing the 
discount rate in multi-period models with capital and taxes on investment income. The discount rate to 
use for public investments is understood to be the shadow price of capital, and for some common classes 
of models this rate will lie between the pre-tax rate of return and the after-tax rate of return (Sandmo and 
Dreze 1971). Sandmo and Dreze find that the social discount rate will be a weighted average of the pre- 
and after-tax rate of interest, similar to Diamond’s definition of the social marginal utility of labor 
income. Yet in contrast to the current literature which has unquestioningly relied on the private value of 
labor income (see, for example, Howarth 2005), there is widespread recognition in the case of capital that 
its social value will diverge from its private value, and that the former is the relevant measure for 
evaluating social optimality. 
  33of clarity, let’s compare the budget constraints for a commodity tax normalization in (19) and the 
labor tax normalization in (20), where income is on the left and expenditures on the right-hand 
side. A one-unit increase in income implies increasing the value of the left-hand side by one unit 
for both budget constraints. In the absence of any revenue-raising taxes, and a wage of $1/hour, 
this would mean an increase in the time endowment of one hour for both. If, however, we 
introduce a 67% commodity tax in (19) and an equivalent labor tax of 0.4 in (20), the units are 
no longer the same for these two budget constraints. A one-unit increase in income in (19) still 
corresponds to an hour of time, but in the case of the labor tax normalization a one-unit increase 
in income corresponds to an increase in the time endowment of 1.67 hours of additional time. 
The private marginal value of income, λ, in this case, is the value of an incremental unit of net 
income. With a 40% income tax rate, the marginal value of income reflects the marginal utility to 
an individual who is indifferent between a choice of an additional 1.67 units of leisure or one 
additional unit of either x or z. If this same situation is presented with a commodity tax 
normalization, the value of λ instead represents the marginal utility to an individual who is 
indifferent in a choice between 1 unit of leisure or 0.6 additional units of either x or z. An 
equilibrium situation in our models with either of these tax normalizations will be equivalent in 
terms of the allocation of resources, welfare, and tax revenues, but the private marginal utility of 
income will differ because the units are different. They correspond to different quantities of 
additional income (time in this case), and so the use of these different normalizations does have 
real implications for the magnitudes of key parameters for the current analysis – the nominal 
environmental tax and the measure of a unit of income – and this further complicates their 
comparability and interpretations.  
 
  34VII. Intuitive Arguments 
 
The intuition suggested in the TI literature includes three related components: 1) that 
environmental taxes are narrower taxes than employment taxes, so that revenue-neutral 
environmental tax reform will narrow rather than broaden the tax base; 2) that there are gross 
costs associated with environmental taxes that are large relative to the revenue-recycling gains, 
and as a result the costs of environmental policy increase in a second-best setting relative to a 
first-best setting; and 3) that the collective (or public) good of environmental quality competes 
with other public goods, so that the marginal cost of environmental policy rises with the marginal 
cost of public funds.  Let’s examine each of these.  
The first claim is that “… environmental taxes generally are more narrow than factor taxes; 
hence, they are less efficient mechanisms for raising revenue … than factor taxes are” 
(Bovenberg and Goulder 2002, p. 1538). This argument appeals to first principles from optimal 
tax theory that broader tax programs generally have lower distortionary costs than narrow ones. 
However, because in this situation a direct tax is being compared to an indirect tax reflecting 
different normalizations, the applicability of the principle is unclear. To see the logic of the 
argument more transparently we can reframe the situation as an equivalent one with uniform 
taxes on all commodities representing the revenue-raising taxes rather than a labor tax. In this 
setting, environmental taxation would involve raising the tax on pollution and using the revenues 
to finance a reduction in the uniform revenue-raising taxes on all other goods. The total tax 
burden on consumers would be unchanged.  
From this vantage point of a commodity tax normalization, the TI intuition is less apparent. 
Environmental taxation adds a tax to a previously untaxed “good” (environmental waste disposal 
  35services) while at the same time allowing commodity tax rates to be slightly lowered. We can see 
this most easily if we assume that emissions are taxed directly and separately from taxes on all 
other commodities. In that light, adding the environmental tax appears to broaden the tax base 
(by adding a new tax on emissions), while at the same time allowing the revenue-raising tax rates 
on all other goods to be lowered. How does this amount to narrowing the tax program? Indeed, 
starting from a first-best optimum where all externalities are taxed at their Pigouvian rates, 
intuition suggests that a broad-based revenue-raising tax program should add Ramsey tax 
premiums to all expenditures including adding a Ramsey premium to the cost of polluting.  
The second intuitive argument in the TI literature suggests that the “gross costs” associated 
with environmental taxes are large relative to the revenue recycling benefits: “Environmental 
taxes introduce gross distortions by reducing the labor supply. The larger the pre-existing labor 
taxes, the greater the wedge between the private and social value of labor, and thus the larger the 
gross cost associated with a given reduction in labor supply. Thus, higher pre-existing labor tax 
rates imply larger costs from given environmental tax reform”(Bovenberg and Goulder 2002).   
Once again the use of a labor tax normalization may obscure this intuitive argument. We 
again reframe this argument in terms of a model where the renormalized tax program includes 
uniform revenue-raising taxes on all goods rather than an income tax. From this perspective we 
can see that the idea of how a tax will discourage labor supply and narrow (slightly) the tax base 
is true for taxes on all goods, not just environmental taxes. Indeed this phenomenon is explicit in 
(11) and applies to non-polluting goods for which the first term will equal zero. It will certainly 
be true that the larger the pre-existing (commodity) taxes, the greater the distortionary effects for 
further tax increases (i.e., the right-hand side of (11)), but this observation applies to all goods 
and is central to setting optimal Ramsey taxes. In the case of pollution, or any other good, higher 
  36revenue requirements and tax rates make the distortionary tax base effects larger due to the size 
of (λ-μ), but the positive revenue recycling effects will be larger as well as they are also 
weighted by (λ-μ). Comparing the revenue recycling effect and the tax base effect in (11), there 
does not appear to be theoretical evidence to supporting “the dominance of the tax-interaction 
effect over the revenue-recycling effect” (Bovenberg and Goulder 2002, p. 1538).   
Nevertheless, the insight that there are both secondary (fiscal) benefits and costs to be traded-
off is an important contribution of the TI literature. Indeed, early contributions to the “double 
dividend” literature considered only the secondary benefits from revenue recycling and ignored 
the secondary costs, resulting in greatly overstated optimal tax rates and associated welfare gains 
from environmental tax reform (e.g., Nordhaus 1993; Jaeger 1995). The TI literature recognized 
that, as with any revenue-raising tax on any commodity, there is both a revenue-generating 
benefit and a distortionary cost.
14 
The third intuitive argument in the TI literature cites the “modified Samuelson Rule” that the 
provision of public goods is justified if the benefits exceed their direct cost by an amount as least 
as large as the additional welfare cost of raising funds with distortionary taxes (Browning 1976, 
283). Since the environment is a public good, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) argue that 
“(i)ntuitively, the collective good of environmental quality directly competes with other 
collective goods. Hence, the marginal costs of environmental policy rise with the marginal cost 
of public funds.” They add that “high costs of public funds crowd out not only ordinary public 
consumption, but also the collective good of the environment.” Similar intuitive arguments are 
                                                 
14 The TI literature frames their analysis in terms of a “gross cost” to environmental tax reform that will 
exceed “primary cost” (Bovenberg and Goulder 2002). They define gross cost as equaling primary cost 
plus the tax interaction effect (secondary cost) minus the revenue-recycling effect (secondary benefit). 
Given these definitions, we would expect at the optimum that (marginal) gross cost will equal marginal 
environmental gains. But, by itself, these definitions and identities of individual welfare effects do not tell 
us how the second-best welfare gains compare to the first-best case.  
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Consider the comparability of environmental taxes and traditional public goods provision. In 
the case of most public goods, revenues must be raised to finance their provision, and as the cost 
of raising revenues increases due to tax distortions this raises the cost to society of producing the 
public good, so fewer public goods are justified due to the higher cost. The case of taxation for 
environmental improvement is somewhat different however. The revenues collected are a 
byproduct of the incentive mechanism used to discourage pollution and improve environmental 
quality, not the cost incurred to produce environmental quality via some public works project or 
centralized abatement (van der Ploeg and Bovenberg 1994). Pollution taxes can improve the 
collective good of environmental quality before any of the revenues have been spent.  
From (12) if the distortionary effects of the environmental tax are higher due to higher 
distortions, so too are the beneficial revenue recycling effects, if those revenues are used to 
finance reductions in preexisting taxes. If they are returned lump-sum to the economy, then the 
tax base effects will represent larger costs the higher are the revenue-raising taxes.  
An alternative intuition sees the environment as an endowed public good that is degraded by 
private actions, and these taxes reduce a “public bad” with the unintended side-effect of making 
public funds available – for other uses. The relationship between the marginal cost of public 
funds and justification for environmental policy seems to be in some sense the converse of the 
modified Samuelson rule. Indeed, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose an 
economy relies on fossil fuel for energy and that the first-best Pigouvian tax on its pollution 
generates exactly the level of revenue needed to provide the optimal level of public goods. Call 
this first-best optimum “scenario B.” Now assume that a technological innovation leads to the 
complete abandonment of fossil fuels (replaced by a clean solar energy technology). Assume 
  38energy costs remain essentially the same due to the higher cost of the technology but zero 
external costs. The other assumptions of our benchmark model hold. Revenues from 
environmental taxes falls to zero, however, leaving public goods provision unfinanced. To 
finance public expenditures, distortionary taxes are introduced but, because of their increased 
cost, a lower level of public goods is provided. Leaving aside the environmental improvements, 
welfare is reduced in this new scenario A compared to scenario B due to the provision of fewer 
public goods and due to the distortionary effects of taxation. Comparing the two scenarios we 
clearly have a situation where the ability to tax an externality was complementary to the 
provision of public goods; it did not compete with other public goods, but made it cheaper to 
provide more of them.
15 Indeed, Metcalf (2003) has shown that in a second-best setting the 
optimal level of environmental quality will likely be higher than in a first-best setting. The 
current thought experiment simply draws attention to the symmetrical complementarity from the 
side of public goods provision.  
A more basic intuition for the understanding that emerges here, and for this thought 
experiment in particular, draws on the principles associated with Henry George about the 
appropriation of resource rents by government as a costless source of revenue. In scenario B, 
rents for environmental waste disposal services accrue to the government. In the case of scenario 
A these rents accrue to the inventors and producers of the solar technology that replaces the 
environment as a key factor of production, leaving the government to turn to distortionary taxes 
to raise revenues. A cap-and-trade program for climate change would be similar. Auctioning a 
fixed number of pollution allowances provides government with a non-distortionary source of 
revenue – relative to giving the emissions rights away – and reduces the revenue that must be 
raised using distortionary taxes.  
                                                 
15 This thought experiment is comparable to the section III discussion about situations A and B.  
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VI. Conclusions 
 
Second-best optimal environmental taxation differs from the first-best case because there 
are two types of marginal benefits and two types of marginal costs to be traded-off. In the first-
best setting, primary costs are traded-off against primary (environmental) benefits up to the first-
best optimal tax. In a second-best setting there are also fiscal effects to consider. In addition to 
the Pigouvian tradeoffs, the marginal fiscal benefits (revenue recycling effects) are traded-off 
against marginal fiscal costs (tax base effects). The central question in the double dividend 
debate has been about the net welfare changes arising from these differences: whether the 
welfare gains from revenue-neutral environmental taxation in a second-best setting are larger or 
smaller than those in a first-best case. The current analysis finds consistent results indicating that 
for benchmark models broadly consistent with parameters for the U.S. economy, the welfare 
gains from second-best environmental taxation are larger than those for a comparable first-best 
setting, and that the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher than the first-best Pigouvian 
rate. Even in economies where the second-best optimal environmental tax may be lower than its 
first-best counterpart, this is not sufficient grounds to conclude that the welfare gains are lower 
than for a first-best setting.  
By contrast, the TI literature claims that pre-existing taxes “significantly raise the costs of 
all environmental policies relative to their costs in a first-best world (Goulder et al. 1999), and 
that “a potentially major element of social costs has been systematically overlooked in the 
analysis of a wide class of public programs and economic institutions” (Parry and Oates 2000). 
In one example the net effect is estimated to raise the costs of an emissions tax by 27% above the 
  40first-best case (Goulder et al., 1999).   
These interpretations in the TI literature are found here to be due to the highly indirect 
approach taken for evaluating the welfare gains from environmental taxation. Rather than 
evaluate the welfare changes directly, this literature set out to test whether the second-best 
optimal environmental tax was higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian tax: By implication, 
if the optimal environmental tax was higher (lower) than the first-best Pigouvian rate, this would 
indicate that the welfare effects were larger (smaller) than in a first-best setting.  
This indirect test, however, is not actually performed anywhere in the TI literature. In 
most cases, rather than comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to the first-best 
Pigouvian rate, the second-best optimal environmental tax is compared instead to an expression 
for MSD
2. And although the Pigouvian rate is equal to MSD
1 in a first-best setting, the definition 
of MSD
2 in a second-best setting is ambiguous and, depending on which definition is used, its 
value varies with the level of taxes and with the tax normalization. It follows that comparing the 
second-best optimal environmental tax to one of six possible measures of MSD
2 is an unreliable 
proxy for the first-best Pigouvian rate. It will be higher for some definitions and lower for others. 
The use of an income tax normalization adds an additional source of confusion by creating a 
divergence between the effective and nominal environmental tax, and this also makes the units of 
private income a function of the labor tax rate. As a result, the use of both an income tax 
normalization and the private marginal utility of income as the numeraire compounds the 
ambiguity and confusion.  
Early contributions promoting the double dividend hypothesis, from Tullock (1967) to 
Terkla (1984), focused on these fiscal benefits but ignored the costs associated with the tax base 
effects. The important contribution of the tax interaction literature has been to recognize that 
  41there were both fiscal benefits and fiscal costs associated with environmental taxation – as with 
any tax pertinent to raising revenues. These insights suggest that, in principle, the second-best 
optimal environmental tax could be lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate if the tax base effects 
are larger than the revenue recycling benefits. In practice, however, the opposite is found to be 
true with the benchmark models used in the TI literature. The “effective” second-best optimal 
environmental tax is found to be about one-third higher than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Indeed, 
this same result is implicit in Bovenberg and Goulder’s (1997) carbon tax numerical model when 
expressed in terms of a commodity tax normalization.  
The implementation of environmental taxes is a different issue altogether. In an economy 
that relies on income taxes for revenue, a given nominal environmental tax will represent a 
higher “effective” environmental tax than reflected in the nominal tax rate. As a result of this, the 
nominal tax on pollution in a second-best setting may indeed decline with rising revenue 
requirements and income taxes compared to the first-best Pigouvian rate. The effective tax on 
pollution, the welfare gains from environmental tax reform, and the optimal level of 
environmental quality, however, are all consistent with the finding that the secondary fiscal 
benefits (revenue recycling effects) exceed the secondary fiscal costs (tax base effects) over a 
range of environmental tax rates up to and exceeding the first-best Pigouvian rate. And these 
findings are consistent with the “strong form” of the double dividend hypothesis as defined by 
Fullerton (1997) in reference to the benchmark models under consideration.  
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